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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF PAROLE1
2
Carter H. White

I.

INTRODUCTION

With public attention directed to the
administrative side of the parole system
in our criminal jurisprudence, 3 too
little heed has been paid the legalistic
side of parole and the direction, if any,
that the law is taking in that regard.
It is the purpose of this paper to indicate some of the legal problems necessarily or unnecessarily involved in the
use of parole as a peno-correctional
device and the treatment thereof by the
courts.4
Of necessity, this paper will be confined to parole as that word is strictly
construed in the criminal law, omitting
absolute pardon, conditional pardon,
commutation, reprieve, probation, and
indeterminate sentence, except where
they are necessary to the explanation
of the problem. Likewise many isolated
problems related to parole will be disregarded or only incidentally mentioned; 5 emphasis being placed on four
or five main divisions.
The defects in a paper of this kind
are several:
1. Data are necessarily limited to
reported appellate court cases, which
means the omission of many points that
were never appealed for lack of money,
connections, or an intelligent lawyer.
' Prepared under the direction

of Professor

Sheldon Glueck of the Harvard Law School.
2

Harvard University Law School, Cambridge,

Mass.
3 Recent publicity on the investigation into the
Mass. parole racket.
4 A similar, though less intensive, work was
done for probation by Professor Sam B. Warner,
"Some Legal Problems Raised by Probation," in
Probation and Criminal Justice, edited by Pro-

2. The courts often confuse parole
with probation or conditional pardon,
thus obfuscating the issues..
3. Many cases deal only with the
interpretation of various sections of a
particular parole statute, with no enunciation of basic principles of parole.
Similar statutes may be construed differently in different states.
4. Some of these problems of statutory interpretation are being solved or
more obscured at each court session,
but new problems are raised in their
stead by' legislative, amendment.'
Notwithstanding these obvious defects, and probably others, this paper
will attempt to categorize the major
legal problems raided by parole, and at
the same time serve as a reference
work for those who desire to delve
more deeply into any particular phase.
Not all cases on each point will be
cited, but reference will be made to
the most complete compilation of notes
available in legal publications. Possible reforms may be occasionally suggested, but this paper is primarily an
analysis of existing law.
To begin with, what is parole?
Webster defines it as7 "conditional
and revocable release ... of a prisoner

with indeterminate or unexpired senfessor Sheldon Glueck.
'Special topics such as liability of a state for
the torts of an insane parolee or whether it is
reversible error for a prosecutor to stress at the
trial or a judge to instruct the jury of the possibility of parole. See 51 H. L. R. 353 (1937).
" This paper does not pretend to be more modern than May, 1941.
7Webster's Unabridged International Diction-

ery, 2nd ed.
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tence." This should be extended to
say, "who has served a part of his
sentence, the release to become absolute on the expiration of his sentence, provided no condition has been
violated."
Although parole has often been confused with probation, there is a definite
and obvious distinction. While probation frequently follows suspended
sentence, it antedates imprisonment;
parole, on the other hand, by its very
definition, requires prior service of a
portion of the sentence. Although both
are peno-corrective devices, probation
is granted by the sentencing judge and
parole is granted by a peno-administrative board, or in some states by the
governor.
Again, parole is often confused with
conditional pardon. The distinction, in
theory, is just as clear between these
two as in the case of probation, but in
practice it is another inatter. In theory,
a pardon on condition is an act of
executive grace, subject to revocation
by the executive at any time. Power
to grant a conditional pardon is inherent in the pardoning power of the Constitution." Occasionally, the executive
can pardon before, as well as after,
conviction or sentence. But these distinctions disappear in practice, particularly in those states where the governor
is both the pardoning and the paroling
authority. In addition, where the conditions attached to the pardon are similar in nature to those attached to
parole, the two take on a marked resemblance. The writer will try to point
out wherever the two are confused and

also where the arguments for one are
almost equally sound for the other.
The legal problems of parole to be
considered fall roughly into four groups.
The first relates to the granting of
parole. Is parole a vested right of the
prisoner? When, by whom, and for
how long can it be granted? What
crimes and criminals are excluded from
the benefits of parole?
The second set of problems relates
to the conditions that may be attached
to parole and what conditions are illegal, such as extension beyond the end
of the sentence. Must the condition be
reasonable?
The third set involves questions concerning the rights of a paroled prisoner,
particularly with regard to the revocation of parole. If he is still a prisoner,
does that mean that none of his civil
rights are restored by parole? Is he
subject to arrest or trial? Can his
parole be revoked only -for violation
of the conditions of parole? If his
parole is revoked', is he entitled to a
hearing on the issues of whether he
violated the conditions and whether
the revocation was properly made by
the proper authorities? What are the
respective functions, of the courts and
the .parole boards in this question of
review of revocations? Does parole
suspend sentence? Does sentence from
crime committed on parole run consecutively or concurrently with first
sentence?
Lastly, there are the questions involving the status of a parolee of one
state who has gone to another state.
How is extradition effected? As a
conflict of laws problem, which law

8 Cf. U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150 (1833);
Ex parte Wells, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 307, 15 L. Ed.

421 (185); and U. S. v.Klein, 13 Wal. (80 U. S.)
128. 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871).
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century almost simultaneously with
commutation of sentence statutes in
New York and Tennessee and with
practical prison use of the "ticket of
leave" in Australia, Bavaria, Spain,
and Norfolk Island, the English penal
colony under Maconochie. The theory
and practice of outright and conditional
pardons 0 also had their direct influences.
The first indeterminate sentence and
parole law" was enacted in Michigan
in 1867. Ten years later the New York
legislature embodied the so-called Reformatory System in a statute relating
to the newly established Elmira Reformatory. Both the indeterminate
sentence and the parole system were
elements of the statute. Ohio followed
suit in 1884. Michigan altered its
statute so as to copy Ohio, but the
Michigan Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional in 1891,12 necessitating
a constitutional amendment.
However, by 1900 twenty states had
adopted a parole system for prison or
reformatory or both. In the succeeding
decade, thirteen states and the federal
government followed the trend. By
1922, Hawaii, the federal government,
and forty-four states 3 had parole laws;
while only thirty-seven states had indeterminate sentence statutes.
The remaining four states (Florida,
H. PAROLE HISTORY
Mississippi, Virginia, and Vermont)
The origins of modern parole 9 are have not been converted entirely, alfound in the first part of the nineteenth though all but Mississippi make a prac-

governs, that of the asylum state or
that of the paroling state? What effect
has the Uniform Out-of-State Parolee
Act had on the whole problem?
Before advancing on these problems,
the writer would like to digress slightly
to give a short history of parole and
parole statutes, and to show the extent
today of the parole system. Also, as a
preliminary to the main study, a short
reference to the typical constitutional
problems involved in parole statutes
would seem to be in order. The constitutional problem is exhaustively
treated in notes at 16 J. Crim. L. 40
(1925) and L.R.A. 1915 F. 531.
The most recent case involving the
constitutionality of a state parole statute arose in Illinois in 1934. The
arguments were that the statute discriminated between resident and nonresident convicts, that it violated the
Illinois constitutional provision of no
warrant without probable cause, and
that it conferred judicial power on a
government department. Although it
was not necessary to the decision, the
court answered each of the arguments,
saying, in relation to the warrant argument, that the constitutional provision
did not apply to paroled convicts still
serving sentence for which they had
been duly convicted.

9 A complete history of parole is found in 16
J. Crim. L. 10 (1925). Cf. 24 J. Crim. L. 88 (1933).
10 The governor of New South Wales was given
power of conditional pardon as early as 1790. For
complete histories of absolute and conditional
pardons, see 59 Am. Dec. 572 and 576 (1853).
11 Indeterminate sentence and parole seem to
have had closely parallel careers, each complementing the other in an integrated reformatory
system.

12

People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 256,14 " IR A.

285.
13See appendix for tabulation of the parole
set-up in the 48 states and the federal government, classified by the author. For a similar
work as to pardon, see 20 J. Crim. L. 364 (1929),
to which list is only to be added Florida, which
has a pardon board.
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tice of granting conditional pardons in
place of parole. In Mississippi the
prison commission probably exercises
some kind of parole power over the
state prison inmates. Virginia had
passed a parole statute'in 1904, but it
was later declared unconstitutional.
So it can be said that today some
form of parole system exists in each of
the forty-eight states, Hawaii, the
District of Columbia, and the federal
prison system, although several states
still confuse parole with conditional
pardon and confer parole power on the
board of pardons or the governor.

IJI. GRA.NnG PAoL

Is Parole a Vested Right of the
Prisoner?
Almost universally the cases say it
is not. Since it is a recent statutory
method of penal treatment, this question turns on the wording of the particular statute, except in those states
which treat parole as an off-shoot of
pardon solely within the discretion of
the executive.

Various surveys of the success of
parole measured by statistics of violations reveal a gradual increase in the
number of paroles granted and a decrease in the number of violations,
records ranging from 5% to 35% violations.14 Because of the variables in
such a narrow survey, such as fortynine different prison reformatory systems and parole practices, carelessness
or dishonesty of parole boards and
parole officers, practice in some states
of automatic parole at the end of the
minimum term, and inability to check
after-life of discharged parolees, statistics of violations are of little value
except to indicate that since the parole
system has arrived as a permanent
institution, a considerable number of
violations have occurred, creating insuperable legal, as well as administrative problems. 15

Under the federal parole law, prior
to the 1930 amendment,'" the recommendation of the Attorney-General
was a prerequisite to parole. Cardigan
v. White, 18 F. (2d) 572 (1927)17 held
that a prisoner has no such vested right
to parole that he' could secure his release, in a habeas corpus proceeding,
where the Attorney-General disapproved of the recommendation of the
federal parole board that he be released
on parole. In California similar effect
was given to the California parole act
in 1938.18 The court said that there is
no such thing as "on parole" until the
prisoner is actually released from
prison, and that where the statute
places the power to grant parole solely
within the discretion of the Board of
Prison Terms, parole becomes a matter
of grace, not of right. The actual holding was that, where the board has
granted a parole to take effect at a
future time, it can rescind its grant
without allowing the prisoner a hear-

14 See Federal Offenders (1939 ed.) U. S. Dep't
of Justice, Bureau of Prisons. On June 30, 1939,
there were 25,222 federal prisoners in federal,
state, and local institutions and 2,399 more out
on parole under supervision of federal parole
board. During the year, 2,601 out of 8,915 cases
considered were released on parole, and there
were only 193 violations. For the past decade the
percentage of violations under the carefully

supervised federal system has been only 6'1.
Cf. Glueck, S. and E. T., 500 Criminal Careers,
Boston, 1930.
IS See: People v. Mikula, 357 Ill. 481, 192 N. E.
546 supra.
16 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 723a.
17 Cert. den. 274 U. S. 755, 47 Sup. Ct. 770 (1927).
18Ex Parte Allen, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 447. 81
Pac. (2d) 168.
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ing. A parole does not become a vested
right upon granting.
In Ex Parte Riley,"' the North
Dakota court said that the pardon
board was not required by the 1923
parole statute to act on its own initiative and parole a prisoner automatically
on the expiration of his minimum
term. The actual holding denied
habeas corpus to a prisoner who had
not served his minimum term. The
court said that even if he had served
his minimum term, he would still have
to prove that he had been harmed by
the inertia of the board.
Closely akin to this question of right
to parole was the problem involved in
Seaton v. State,2 0 where the defendant

committed burglary while one parole
statute was in force, but was convicted
and sentenced to from five to ten years
under an amended statute, which was
in force at the time of the trial. The
former statute directed the judge to
impose a sentence of from one to ten
years; the latter directed him to raise
the minimum to five years. Since the
prisoner was eligible for parole at the
end of the minimum term under both
statutes, he was deprived of four years
of eligibility by the five year sentence.
The appellate court amended the sentence to a term of from one to ten years,
thus enforcing the former statute.

which provided that prisoners serving
definite terms were eligible for parole
on service of one-third of the sentence.
Defendant was sentenced to eight years,
but President Wilson commuted to
four years, and it was held that he was
eligible for parole after serving one
year and four months. Mandamus was
issued to compel the federal parole
board to consider his application for
parole, although the actual granting
was in the board's discretion. There
is a vigorous dissent by Judge Ross to
the effect that the statutory 2' phrase
"one-third of the total of such term or
terms for which he was sentenced"
clearly means the original sentence imposed by the court, and not as commuted by the President.
The tendency of the courts seems to
be to treat separate sentences on different counts of one indictment as a
single term, rather than separate terms,
for the purposes of pardon, parole, and"
suspension.2

2

This means that a prisoner

cannot be eligible for parole until he
has served the minimum time specified
by the parole statute in relation to the
combined single term. Whether the
sentences are concurrent or consecutive, of course, depends on the intent,
express or implied, of the sentencing
judge. This problem will be treated
later.

On this question of eligibility for
parole the statutes seem to differ, some
being specific, others not. Duehay v.
Thompson, 223 F. 305 (1915) involved
construction of the federal act of 1913

An interesting legal sidelight on the
subject of granting paroles is the validity of contracts to procure parole. The
gist of two exhaustive legal notes2 3 on
the subject seems to be that a contract

Cf. Red-

21 37 Stat. 650. Comp. St. 1913 sec. 10535, Fed.
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1914) p. 326.
22 107 A. L. R. 634 (1936).
23 46 A. L. R. 215 (1926) and ,111 A. L. R. 35

19 52 N. D. 471, 203 N. W. 676 (1925).

man v. Duehay, 246 F. 283 (1917) where the parole board was upheld in refusing to grant pa-

role.
20109 Neb. 828, 192 N. W. 501 (1923).,

(1937).

Cf. Gordon v. Gordon, 168 Ky. 409, 182

S. W. 220, L. R. A. 1916 D, 576 (1916).
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entered into by an attorney to use his administrative board of which the govlegal services in putting the proper
ernor may or may not be a member;
information before the paroling author- in twelve states it is vested in the
ities in an effort to obtain a parle is governor alone, sometimes with advalid unless the use of personal in- visory power in a parole board, council
fluence was contemplated. The infer- or commissioner; in seven states the
ence is that a contract made by a power is divided between the governor
layman to aid in securing a parole and a parole board, both of whom must
would be void as against public policy concur in every parole. 26
because of the personal element preOrdinarily, the time of granting
sumed to be present. Of course these parole is discretionary with the parolcontracts are legal only in those states ing authority except that it cannot be
which do not have express statutory prior to the minimum specified by the
prohibitions against attorneys inter- statute. If it is a definite sentence
pleading for parole.
jurisdiction, the statute specifies a
24
A 1926 Arizona case
provides fraction of the sentence as a minimum;
another interesting side-light. The if an indeterminate jurisdiction, the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld a statute specifies the minimum sentence,
county superior court in punishing the generally in the form of "the minimum
superintendent of the state prison for sentence specified by statute for the
contempt for releasing a prisoner on a particular crime."
parole which was illegally granted by
the governor. The decision is severe
on the superintendent who was only
obeying orders. The case stands for
two further propositions: that no convict can be eligible for parole in Arizona until he has completed his minimum sentence, and that the governor
has no power to parole, it being vested
exclusively in the parole board.
Who Has the Power to Grant Parole?
It is clear from the cases that in all
but the four conditional pardon
jurisdictions the power to grant parole
is lodged exclusively in that body
designated by the parole statute. In
the federal system and in twenty-five
states that power is vested in an
24 State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Superior

Court, 30 Ariz. 332, 246 Pac. 1033.
25 See appendix. The remaining four are the
conditional pardon states (Fla., Miss., Va., and

Vt.).

The question of duration of parole
involves the problems- of when the
parole can be revoked and whether it
can be extended beyond the original
term of sentence. These questions will
be considered later under more appropriate headings.
What Crimes and Criminals Are Excluded26 by Statute from the Benefits
of Parole, and Are These Provisions
Constitutional?
In some states only first offenders are
eligible for parole; in others no discrimination is made against recidivists.
Prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment are eligible after a specified term,
generally fifteen years, as in the federal
statute, or are not eligible at all. In
See 59 Am. Dec. 573 (1853) for list of crimes
at common law for which the executive could
grant pardon.
26
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those states having an indeterminate
sentence law, parole may not be had
until service of the minimum term,

unless there is no minimum term, as
in New York for the Elmira Reformatory. In the same state the law may
differ according to the penal institution. New York, for example, has
different provisions for the prisons, the
reformatory, the reform schools, and
the first-class city prisons.
Those crimes which, almost universally, are excluded by statute from
parole consideration are treason, firstdegree murder, third conviction of
felony, and very often those crimes
which are subject to punishment by
life imprisonment, such as rape, in the
southern states, and kidnapping.
What Provisions Are Made as to
Race, Sex, or Age?
No discrimination could be found
against race, in specific terms, but as
to age, several statutes exclude those
over a certain age. Wyoming, for
example, disqualifies from parole consideration all convicts over twenty-five.
Most indeterminate and parole statutes
apply only to men over sixteen or
eighteen and women over eighteen.
This leaves opportunity for specific
juvenile delinquency legislation.
Whenever these provisions have been
contested on constitutional grounds,
they have been upheld on the basis of
their being a general law applicable to
27

all.

In using their discretion to grant or
not to grant parole, the parole boards,
in practice, tend to emphasize, some27 Cf. People v. Mikula, 357 Ill.
481, 192 N. E.
548 (1934).

times unduly, the nature of the crime
and the sentence. Proper weight
should, of course, be given to other
factors, including the individual record
and personal attitude of the prisoner.
Criteria used by intelligent boards include these questions: Will the best
interests of society be served by his
release? Has he kept the institutional
rules? Has he shown the ability and
the desire to lead a law-abiding life?
Have suitable work and decent surroundings been found for him? Was
the nature of his crime such that he
might be a menace to society? Did he
use force in its commission? Were there
extenuating circumstances? What is
his previous criminal record? What is
his status after examination by competent doctors and psychiatrists? Varying emphasis will be given to the different factors as the circumstances
require. Court review of the weight
that should be given to these factors
is non-existent.
IV.

CoNDiTIONs ATTACHED TO PAROLE

What Conditions May Be Attached
to Parole?
The general ride seems to be that
any reasonable condition which is not
immoral, illegal, or impossible of performance may be made a part of the
parole.

2

Conditions range2

9

from vague gen-

eralities like "obey the law faithfully"
to oppressive minutiae like "shall be
off the streets nightly at 10 p. m." The
three most frequent conditions are that
the parolee shall be law-abiding, that
he shall report monthly in detail as to
28 Cf. 59 Am. Dec. 576 et seq. for conditions attachable to pardon.
29 See 12 J. Crim. L. 554 (1921).
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his working and leisure habits, and that
he shall be subject to reimprisonment
for violation of any of the prescribed
conditions. Another is the territorial
condition that he shall not cross a
county or state line without permission
from the paroling authorities. Often a
board will impose detailed regulations
which do more harm than good. For
instance, it may require that the parolee attend church regularly, refrain
from tobacco and liquor, and be at
home every night before ten o'clock.
Such unintelligent administration begs
for minor violations without contributing to the reformation of the
prisoner.
The statute or the parole instrument
may state that, in the discretion of the
board or governor, the prisoner may be
unconditionally discharged after a certain term spent on parole, say one year;
or the prisoner may be regarded as
being within the constructive custody
of the parole authorities until the expiration of his maximum term. As to
whether a condition may subject the
parolee to supervision beyond his maximum term, there seems to be a split of
authority. Theoretically, the prisoner
is serving time while on parole and
should be unconditionally released at
the expiration of his maximum term,
less any time earned for good conduct
under a specific statute. In practice,
however, the cases vary widely. Some
follow the true theory of parole; 30
others liken parole to conditional pardon and say that by accepting the
eondition the prisoner is bound forever,
regardless of the expiration of the max-

imum sentence." The cases under the
federal law are a sort of hybrid of these
two theories, holding that a prisoner is
serving his sentence while on parole
and will be unconditionally released at
the end of the maximum term, but if he
is retaken for violation of any condition prior to the end of the maximum
term, he is subject to his unexpired
sentence without credit for the term he
served on parole.32 These decisions are
necessitated by the statutory words,
"the time the prisoner was on parole
shall not diminish the time he was
'3
originally sentenced to serve." 3
In the Stephens case the parole document expressly set out the condition
"that the defendant violate no laws of
Kansas for a period of two years." This
was upheld despite the fact that the
defendant had been sentenced only for
six months and had already served part
of that when granted parole. The
explanation is that by the law of Kansas
a parole operates to suspend sentence
so that the balance of the sentence
hangs over the parolee's head until the
fulfillment of the condition.
On the contrary, in Ex Parte Prout
the Idaho Supreme Court, as early as
1906, recognized the general principle
that no condition to a pardon or parole
can be immoral or illegal. It held illegal
a condition which provided that the
parolee, on revocation of his parole for
any violation of its conditions, would
be subject to reimprisonment and service of his original unserved sentence
without credit for the period spent on
parole. The theory was that the condition was tantamount to an illegal

30 Ex Parte Prout, 12 Ida. 494, 86 Pac. 275, 5
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064 (1906).
31 Stephens v. Bertrand, 151 Kan. 270, 98 Pac.
(2d) 123 (1940).

32See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U. S. 359, 58 Sup.
Ct. 872 (1938) and Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S.
193, 44 Sup. Ct. 43 (1923).
"318 U. S. C. A. chap. 22, sec. 723c.

CARTER H. WHITE

extension of sentence. The court
reached the proper result, but it confused the true meaning of parole,
construing it as an act of clemency
rather than the modern idea of regulatory reformation. The court tacitly
approved conditions of a minor nature,
such as remaining within certain county
boundaries and sending to the warden
a monthly written report certified by
the employer of the parolee, stating his
employment, earnings, and itemized expenditures. In the instant case the
prisoner had been sentenced to three
years and was paroled after serving
seventeen months. Five months latei
his parole was revoked for alleged violation of conditions and he was reimprisoned. After serving fifteen months
more, he applied for habeas corpus on
the ground that his sentence had expired, and the writ was granted.
Those cases holding the opposite
view, like the Stephens case, supra, are
distinguishable on the ground that they
liken parole to conditional pardon so
that sentence is suspended by the
granting of parole" and the conditions
remain in force indefinitely.
V. PAROLEE'S RIGHTS; REVOCATION

Are a Prisoner'sCivil Rights
Restored by Parole?
The cases are silent, but the sensible
answer would seem to be in the negative; that since parole is not a form of
pardon (although many courts have so
treated it), the parolee is still a prisoner
:'I For the various cases, see 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1064 (1906); 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304 (1908); 26
L. R. A. (N. S.) 110 (1910). Cf. Wilborn v.
Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 195 S. E. 723 (1938).
::See 4 Black. Com. 402 for common law effect
of pardon. Cf. Ex parte Wells, supra. For effect
of conditional pardon as not restoring civil

serving out his sentence, albeit in a less
confining environment than prison,
with the opportunity of being restored
to society.' He stands in no better position, with minor exceptions, than a convict still in prison, in relation to civil
rights such as voting, holding public
office, serving as a witness or a juror.
As to property rights, he has advantage
over the prison inmate only in that he
is, to a certain extent, free to use or
dispose of his property in the outside
world; but parole, unlike pardon, does
not restore any property rights forfeited by conviction. '5
Is a Parolee Subject to Arrest?
Under some statutes a parolee is in
the same position as a prison inmate in
respect to arrest, and he cannot lawfully be taken and confined by police
authorities for pending indictment" or
prior conviction.:37 The theory seems to

be that he is constructively within the
prison walls and is thus immune from
arrest. Although the court will not revoke his "parole" merely to allow the
district attorney to arrest him under a
pending indictment, People v. Whitcomb seems to say that the parole officer will produce the parolee at the trial
of the indictment. But the parolee's
immunity from arrest does not extend
to crimes committed while he is on parole. Ordinarily, the parole board has
first chance at the delinquent parolee,
but if the board is slow, the arrest by
police for crime committed on parole is
rights, see 1 Bish Crim. L. sec. 898. Cf. 19 Tex.
App. 635, 53 Am. Rep. 395 (1885).
3,People v. Whitcomb 118 Misc. 615, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 209 (1922). The court's opinion obscures
the fact as to whether it is parole or probation.

37 State ex rel. Nicholson v. Bush, 136 Tenn.
478, 190 S.W. 453 (1916).
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condoned."- He may or may not be
ordered to serve his second sentence
before the unexpired part of his first
sentence.
The parolee also has a right to freedom from unlawful arrest. In People v.
Bendoni, :'the Michigan prisoner, who

had been convicted of armed robbery,
was out on parole to a "next friend" in
Pennsylvania on the condition that he
stay outside Michigan until his sentence
was served. The Michigan statute provided that the warden had the sole
power to arrest and return parolee to
prison upon violation of parole conditions. The parolee returned to Michigan one Christmas for the holidays to
see his sister, under express written
permission from the next friend. A
policeman arrested him on sight,
searched him at the station, and found
a concealed revolver. He was tried,
convicted, and confined to prison for
carrying concealed weapons, his sentence to run after service of the unexpired part of his first term, which
had been called into play by the paroling authorities. The Michigan Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the
ground of unlawful arrest by the policeman, illegal search for evidence, and
use of illegal evidence at the trial. But
the prisoner was not sent safely back
to Pennsylvania. Instead, the court remanded him to the tender mercies of
the warden for disposition on the parole
violation.
The parolee's right to freedom from
arrest does not extend to freedom from
indictment and trial for an offense com38 See Anderson v. Corall, supra, and Stockton
v. Massey, infra.

39 263 Mich. 295, 248 N. W. 627 (1933).
40 See L. R. A. 1915 E, 363 and 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1095 (1913).

initted prior or subsequent to the crime
for which he has been paroled.' Since
he can be put on trial for another crime
while on parole, his freedom from arrest appears to be without substance in
the pending indictment situation, and is
only of value where he is wanted for
prior conviction.
Where a person. on conviction of a
crime, is sentenced and fined at the
same time, a later parole will not relieve him from payment of the fine,
unless the parole instrument so states.
But where, by operation of statute, a
parolee becomes unconditionally discharged through failure of the paroling

authorities to take appropriate action
within the prescribed statutory time,
he is thereby also relieved from payment of the fine, which was part of the
original punishment." But a distinction seems to be drawn between fines
and costs, and the parolee remains liable for the latter,4" even though they
were a part of the original punishment.
By Whom and for What Reasons
Can Parole Be Revoked?
Ordinarily the statutes provide that
the same authority which granted parole has the power to set the conditions
and to revoke the parole, in its discretion, for violation of those conditions.
The problems arise where the statutes
are ambiguous or silent. Must the parole board give reasons for revoking?
Some statutes require, not only that
reasons be given, but, more important.
that the parolee be given an opportunity to refute those reasons at a hear41

Badgley v. Morse, 132 Kan. 544. 296 Pac. 344

(1931).
42 See 74 A. L. R. 1121 (1931) for the effect of
pardon on fines and costs.
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ing. The serious questions arise where
no such provision is made.
When Can Parole Be Revoked?
In all but the "conditional pardon"
jurisdictions, the answer is any time
prior to, but not later than the end of
the maximum sentence. A federal
case 43 held that, inasmuch as revocation had been made before the end of
the maximum term, the arrest could be
deferred until the prosecution, conviction, and sentence for a separate crime
were completed, even though this was
beyond the maximum sentence term.
But in Ex parte Ridley 44 the Oklahoma
court treated the parole as a conditional
pardon suspending sentence and held
that the governor could revoke a parole
after the expiration of the maximum
term. The prisoner had been sentenced
to four years and paroled after serving
two years and a half. He committed
the violation about a week after his
four years was up, and the governor
immediately revoked the parole without a hearing. In a habeas corpus proceeding the parolee was held to have
the right to a court hearing on the issue
of his violation. The court found that
he had violated the condition not to
frequent liquor establishments, and so
remanded him to prison, thereby upholding a seemingly illegal condition.
The "conditional pardon" cases involving the imprisonment of the parolee
beyond his maximum sentence fall
roughly into two groups: those in
43 Stockton v. Massey, 34 F. (2d) 96 (1929). Cf.
Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 173 (1934).
443 Okla. Crim. 350, 106 Pac. 549 (1910).
45 Stephens v. Bertrand, supra. Contra: Ex
parte Prout, supra.
46 Ex parte Ridley, supra; Ex parte Patterson,
94 Kan. 439, 146 Pac. 1009 (1915); Contra: Woodward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 1047 (18q0).

which the parole instrument, itself, subjects the parolee to unfulfilled conditions extending beyond his maximum
term,'5 and those in which the parole
is revoked and the parolee retaken despite the silence of the instrument.";
Is the ParoleeEntitled to a Hearing
on Revocation of His Parole?
There are three possible situations:
The statute is specific as to hearing or
summary revocation, the parole document itself is specific, or neither is
specific. The general rule seems to be
that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary he is entitled to
a court hearing on the issue of violation of conditions. 4 T Ex parte Ridley,
supra, and State v. Wolfer,48 although
both involve conditional pardon language, illustrate the labored arguments
for protection of the individual from
arbitrary bureaucratic action by the
right to a hearing in court. The latter
case indicated that the prisoner might
be entitled to a jury trial49 if his identity
were in issue. In the final analysis, the
blame for these decisions lies with the
legislature in failing to make the statute
specific.
Where the statute provides for summary revocation at the discretion of
the board, it is generally upheld on the
ground that a parole violation is not a
new crime nor is return to prison a
new punishment, for a parolee has already been accorded all his rights and
has been duly convicted, so that he
47 For cases, see 54 A. L. R. 1474 (1927) cf. Fleenor v. Hammond, 28 F. Supp. 625 (W. D. Ky.
1939).
4s 53 Minn. 135, 54 N. W. 1065, 19 L. R. A. 783
(1893).
49 See dictum in Kennedy's case, 135 Mass. 48
(1883).
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stands in the position of a prisoner, at
large in the discretion of the board.50
The California statute in In Re Tobin
was interpreted to mean that no hearing is required on the issue of revocation, but that one is required before the
parole board on the issue of forfeiture
of credits. Under the Parole Commission Law for First Class Cities in New
York State, revocation of parole is not
subject to judicial review, but is exclusively in the hands of the parole commission, whether the issue be violation
of conditions,," or legal grant of parole
52
in the first place.
Where the statute or the parole instrument expressly provides for a hearing, it is generally interpreted to mean
53
hearing before the paroling authority.
But where there is no specific provision,
as already explained, the courts insist
on a hearing in court. The distinction
apparently arises from the courts' overzealous anxiety to preserve their place
in the protection of the individual
wherever the legislature was silent. It
seems that the court will'not inquire
into the nature of the hearing given by
the board, unless the parolee can produce substantial contradictory evidence. In U. S. ex rel. Rowe v. Nicholsons' it was held that the federal parole
board's formal certificate that a hearing
was given could not be collaterally upset in a habeas corpus proceeding
merely by the parolee's verbal contradiction.

In the third situation, where the parole instrument expressly reserves to
the paroling authority the power of
summary revocation without hearing,
the parolee is generally heid to be
bound by the express provision.5 One
line of reasoning seems to be that the
waiver of hearing was made a condition to ,the parole contract, and the
parolee, by his acceptance of the condition, is bound thereby. Although the
analogy to contracts is subject to attack, 56 the result of these cases is correct except where the question arises
of keeping the prisoner beyond his
term. It would -seem that no degree of
willingness on the part of the prisoner
could bargain him beforehand into a
longer term of imprisonment than that
imposed by the sentencing court, but
apparently that is just what is done in
those jurisdictions treating parole as
conditional pardon suspending sentence
until reconfinement, often after the
original term of sentence has expired.

50 InRe Tobin, 130 Cal. App. 371, 20 Pac. (2d)
91 (1933); ES parte Patterson, supra; People ex
rel. Romain v. N. Y. C. Parole Commission, 116
Misc. 758, 191 N. Y. Supp. 410 (1921).
51 People ex rel. Romain v. Commission, supra.
52 People ex rel. Rabiner v. Warden of City
Prison, 209 App. Div. 795, 205 N. Y. Supp. 694
(1924).
55 The federal statute expressly says, "hearing before the parole board."

54 78. F. (2d) 468 (1935): cert. den. 296 U. S.
573, 56 Sup. Ct. 118. Cf. Shearer v. Sanford, 115
F. (2d) 214 (1940).
55 Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596. 131 N. W. 914
(1911); Ex parte Collins, 32 Okla. Crim. 6, 239
Pac. 693 (1925). See Ex parte Woodward. 58
Okla. Crim. 333, 53 Pac. (2d) 288 (1936) affirming

Ex parte Prout and Woodward v.
Murdock, supra, and the federal cases
cited previously are among those upholding the true parole theory that the
parole cannot be revoked after the
original term of sentence has expired.
These cases uphold the condition of
summary revocation before the end of
the term, not on the theory of contracts, but on the ground that the paroling authority has the power to impose

the rule in the Collins case.

56 See 39 H. L. I. 112, n. 12 (1925) for the same
problem in relation to conditional pardon.
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any reasonable condition."; Fleanor v.
Hammond, supra, which involves a conditional pardon, illustrates the rule that
where the pardon or parole instrument
fails clearly to reserve arbitrary power
of revocation, it will be interpreted
most favorably to the parolee so as to
entitle him to a hearing.
It is apparently the law that in all
situations, even where the statute or the
parole instrument expressly abolishes
any hearing, the parolee is entitled to
a hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction on three issues: 1. Con-

The granting of parole to a convicted
person, pending appeal of his conviction, seems to operate as a waiver of
his appeal according to the only reported case directly involving that
point. 1'

The Oklahoma court went on

the theory that an appeal was inconsistent with acceptance of parole.

Does a Parole Operate to Suspend the
Running of the Parolee'sSentence?
Does the time served out on parole
fall to the parolee's credit in the computation of the service of his sentence?
These are questions of particular imfinement beyond his term,5 8 2. Au- portance to the parolee when the pathority of the persons revoking to re- roling authority attempts to revoke his
voke,5 9 3. Parolee's identity."° As noted parole. Theoretically, the indetermiabove, however, the question whether nate sentence and parole system is dethere has been a violation of parole signed to confine the criminal for a
conditions is seldom reviewable except reformatory period within the instituin the first situation where there is an tion and a subsequent, though less conabsence of specific provisions."
fining, reformatory period outside the
institution. This means that the prisoner
Is Violation of the Conditionsof Parole is still sdrving his sentence while on
a Separate Crime Subject to Court
parole, under the supervision of the
Trial, Conviction, and
parole board. However, the variety of
Separate Sentence?
statutes in force during the past few
Pennsylvania produces this anomaly decades has given all kinds of weird
by a statute providing that a parole effects to the original purpose. And
violation is a misdemeanor. Such a where the legislature has been constatute results from the failure to fused, the court has taken it upon itunderstand that the efficacy of a parole self to put meaning into the ambiguity,
system depends on authority being thus adding to the confusion.
The cases fall roughly into three
lodged solely in one administrative
63
1. Those in which parole
board with disciplinary power to deal groups:
suspends sentence, with or without
with parole violations.
7See Lime v. Blagg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d)

51

583 (1939) for failure of lifer's argument that
"sick parole" amounted to commutation not revokable without court review.
5s A strong minority of cases, using "conditional pardon" language, holds that confinement
beyond the term is not in issue where the parolee has accepted that condition to the parole

contract.
59 See Ex parte Collins, supra, holding that the
arbitrary power of revocation devolved on the

lieutenant-governor after the impeachment of
the governor.
60 Dicta in two cases. See notes 48 and 49
supra.

c1 See People v. Murphy, 274 N. Y. 281, 8 N. E.
(2d) 861 (1937) for statutory jury trial only on
question of fact as to violation.
6 Rogers v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. 349, 71 Pac.
(2d) 635 (1937).
63 For cases see 68 L. Ed. 247 (1923): 28 A. L. R.
947 (1922); and 116 A. L. R. 811 (1938). Cf. Wilborn v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 195 S. E. 723 (1938).
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statutory expression, 2. Those in which
it does not, with or without enlightenment from the statute, and 3. Cases under the hybrid federal statute, which
provides that parole does not suspend
sentence, but that time served on parole is not credited to the parolee if
he is reimprisoned for a violation committed before the expiration of his
sentence.
The Oklahomaj Kansas, and Vermont
cases4 seem to fall in the non-statutory
section of the first group. The Idaho
and Indiana cases fall into the nonstatutory section of the second group."
Anderson v. Corall and Stockton v.
Massey, supra, and similar cases fall
under the third group.
The question generally arises in a
habeas corpus proceeding brought by
the parolee to determine the legality of
the revocation and the length of his
legal confinement. The cases are in
confusion because of the failure of the
courts to distinguish the three situations: 1. Where the parole violation
occurred after the expiration of the
maximum sentence, 2: Where it occurred after the expiration of the maximum sentence less the statutory time
for good behavior, and 3. Where it occurred before the end of the maximum
term while the prisoner was still on
parole. In all these cases the parole
board is trying to confine the prisoner
for the balance of his unserved sentence without credit for time served on
parole. Obviously, under the first situation, the board has lost its jurisdiction
over the parolee, 6 except in those juris-

dictions which analogize parole to conditional pardon- suspending sentence
indefinitely.
To what ridiculous extremes a court
can go in revoking parole beyond the
maximum term is evidenced by the
Oklahoma case of Ex parte Butler."
Here, the prisoner was convicted of
adultery, sentenced to eighteen months,
and paroled after serving seven months.
Twelve years later he was convicted of
driving under the influence and was
sentenced to one year. During his service of that sentence the governor revoked the original parole. The court
upheld the governor's contention that
the prisoner was subject to the unexpired eleven months of the adultery
sentence after the completion of his
second sentence. This is the logical
result ad absurdum of following the
earlier Oklahoma cases that parole suspends sentence indefinitely.
The second situation requires the existence of a statute providing for a reduction in time for good behavior.
Woodward v. Murdock, supra, held that
the governor had lost his jurisdiction
to revoke the parole after the prisoner
had served his sentence, as reduced by
the statutory good time allowance and
time on parole.* In Ex parte McKenna,
supra, it was held that the statutory
deduction would be applied in the final
computation, but that the 'prisoner was
still subject to his unserved term, even
though more time had elapsed than the
maximum term.
Under the third situation, it is clear
that the parole board still has juris-

64 Cf. Ex parte Collins, supra; Stephens v.
Bertrand, 151 Kan. 270, 98 Pac. (2d) 123 (1940);
Ex parte McKenna, 79 Vt. 34, 64 At. 77 (1906).
65 Ex parte Prout and Woodward v. Murdock,

S. E. 760, 28 A. L. R. 940 (1922).
6f Cf. Ex parte Prout, supra.
OT Cf. Ex parte Ridley and Ex parte McKenna,
supr.

#upra. Cf. Crooks v. Saunders, 123 S. C. 28, 115

68

40 Okla. Crim. 434, 269 Pac. 786 (1928).
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federal parole statute was subject to the
opposite interpretation 5 as well. Should
this general rule be applied to parole
situations? Theoretically, the parolee
is subject only to the disciplinary action
of the parole board. For an appellate
court to declare the sentences concurIs the Second Sentence Consecutive
rent, especially where the offenses were
or Concurrent?
committed in different jurisdictions,
seems to be an unwarranted extension
a
crime
When a prisoner commits
while on parole and is convicted and of judicial power and a nullification of
sentenced, does his second sentence run the purpose of the parole system.
consecutively or concurrently69 with
In Zerbst v. Kidwell, the United
the unexpired portion of his first sen- States
Supreme
Court, speaking
tence? Where a statute expressly pro- through Justice Black, resolved the
vides for this situation, there is seldom chaotic federal situation and held that
7
70
In Re Daniels '
any legal problem.
the federal parole statute meant the
the court held that a parolee convicted sentences to be consecutive. Section
of another crime who did not inform 723c of the statute was interpreted7 6 to
the sentencing judge of the first sen- mean that the unexpired portion of the
tence and parole, could not later, by first sentence does not begin to run on
availing himself of the statute requiring imprisonment for the second crime, but
the judgment to state whether consecu- only on reimprisonment on the original
tive or concurrent, evade the remainder sentence at the behest of the parole
of his first sentence.
board. The effect of the second crime
Nor is there any problem where the was to suspend the sentence for the first
judgment expressly states that the sec- crime during the imprisonment for the
ond sentence shall run consecutively or second crime. Because of the additional
concurrently with the first sentence.72 factor under the statute that time on
In the absence of statute or express parole is not counted in the final comprovision in the second judgment to putation, the prisoners were forced to
the contrary, the general rule seems to serve out their original sentence as if
be that the second sentence runs con- no parole had been granted. The decurrently with the unserved part of the cision amounts to overruling White v.
first.7 3 This was the rule followed in Kwiatkowski, although the latter case
White v. Kwiatkowski,7 4 although the was not specifically mentioned. As a
diction, and it seems equally clear that
upon recommitment the prisoner should
be credited with the time served on
parole, unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary, such as the federal one.

69 See 116 A. L. . 811 (1938).
70 See N. Y. Correction Law sec. 218, 219, requiring first sentence, first service. Cf. People
ex rel. Block v. Warden, 252 App. Div. 825, 299
N. Y. Supp. 357 (1937); People v. Loveless, 140
Cal. App. 291, 35 Pac. (2d) 574 (1934).
71110 Cal. App. 638, 294 Pac. 735 (1930).
72 People v. Loveless, n. 70 supra.

73See 5 A. L. R. 380 (1919); 53 A. L. R. 625

(1927).

Ex parte McDonald, 178 Wis. 167, 189

N. W. 1029 (1922).
74 60 F. (2d) 264 (1932) Tenth Circuit.
7S Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U. S. 359, 58 Sup. Ct.

872 (1938).
76 18 USCA chap. 22, sec. 723c: "The unexpired
term of imprisonment shall begin to run from the
date he is returned to the institution, and the
time he was on parole shall not diminish the time
he was originally sentenced to serve."
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result, the Tenth Circuit reversed its
position in two later cases. 7 The supreme court had already led the way
in 1923 in Anderson v. Corall, supra,
so that no other result could logically
have been reached in the Zerbst case.
The law in the federal jurisdictions
is now clear in the field of consecutive
versus concurrent sentence for convicted parolees, but the state law is still
a jumble. The case of Canfield v. Parole
Commissioner8 illustrates that Michigan, at least, has a definite position.
The case serves as a good example of
the various aspects of the rights of a
paroled convict which can be put in
issue in one litigation, with particular
reference to the interpretation of Michigan statutes. Here, the prisoner was
convicted i December, 1926, of breaking and entering, and was sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of from
two fo five years, although the statute
called for a maximum of fifteen years.
In August, 1928, he was paroled, but
was hardly out when he was convicted
of armed robbery, and sentenced in
December to from twenty to forty
-years. In March,.1929, the parole commissioner revoked the parole without
a hearing and ordered the parolee to
serve out his unexpired first term before commencing his second sentence.
This procedure was in strict compliance with the statute. In .February,
1936, the commissioner invoked his
statutory authority to annul the remaining portion of the first sentence,
in order to enable the prisoner to start
service of his second sentence. The
prisoner brought mandamus to compel
the commissioner to correct the prison
77 Aderhold v. Ashock, 99 F. (2d) 67 (1938) and
Aderhold v. Murphy, 103 F. (2d) 492 (1939).

records so as to show that his second
sentence began to run in December,
1928, at the time it was imposed. But
the Michigan Supreme Court unanimously refused the writ, upholding the
commissioner's contention that the second sentence began in February, 1936.
It said that the original sentence was
void and should be treated as for a
maximum of fifteen years, as the statute
required. It ran until annulled in February, 1936, when the second sentence
came into force. On the point of revocation without hearing, the court held
that the parole statute refused the
privilege of hearing to the prisoner
where he was convicted of a felony
while on parole.
When There Are Two Possible Parole
Statutes to Be Applied, Which
Is the Governing One?
If the later statute is enforced, is it
unconstitutionally retroactive? In People ex rel. Tower v. Hunt, 36 F. Supp.
49 (1940), the district court held that
the parolee was subject to the revocation procedure prescribed by the statute
in force when he violated his parole, not
when he was convicted and sentenced,
or paroled. Here the New York statute
prior to 1930 gave a parolee the right
to a jury trial on the question of violation of parole conditions and provided
that the arrest warrant should be issued
by a magistrate. The amendment of
1930 placed sole power in the hands of
the parole board. The prisoner was
convicted and paroled before 1930, but
violated his parole in 1937. He -was
held subject to the amendment on the
theory that he was in the constructive
78

280 Mich. 305, 273 N. W. 578 (1937).
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custody of the prison warden until the
end of his maximum term and so was
subject to the law which was in effect
when he violated his parole."'
VI.

EXTRADITION OF PAROLEES

When a Parolee of One State Goes to
Another State, Can He Be Extradited
for Violation of His Parole?
As a conflict of laws problem, which
law governs? Theoretically, the law of
the paroling state should govern, and
the only reasonable requirement for
rendition should be that the parolee has
an unexpired sentence in the demanding state which the parole board feels
that he should finish. In practice, that
seems to be the general rule, although
it has been held that where the violating act occurred in the asylum state,
the courts of the latter state can determine whether it actually was a 'violation. Such was the holding in People
ex rel. Pahlv. Pollack,0 where the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, refused to grant extradition of a
Pennsylvania parolee on the ground
that the alleged violative act had not
been shown and that the Pennsylvania
parole board would fail to accord the
parolee a fair hearing on this issue.
Here, the parolee had been granted
permission by the Pennsylvania Board
of Pardons to return to his native state
of New York. Upon a charge of being
accessory to an abortion, he was arrested by the New York State Parole
79 Cf. Magistro v. Wilson, 253 App. Div. 48, 300
N. Y. Supp. 1216 (1937).
so 174 Misc. 981, 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 413 (1940);

cf. 54 H. L. R. 508 (1941).
13,Cf. Ex parte La Vere, 39 Nev. 214 156 Pac. 446
(1916), where the Nevada Court declared that the
evidence clearly showed that the prisoner was
not a fugitive from New Jersey, intimating that

if the evidence had been conflicting, it would

have left the matter to the demanding state. No

Board and later released. Then the
Pennsylvania board requested the Governor of Pennsylvania for the parolee's
extradition, and his requisition was
honored by the New York Governor,
who had the parolee arrested. On a
habeas corpus hearing, the New York
court found no evidence of guilt of the
abortion charge, after the original complaining witness withdrew her accusation, and granted the writ. The court's
theory, apparently, was that the Pennsylvania parole board would be prejudiced against the parolee and thus
would not give him a fair hearing. New
York seems to be the only jurisdiction
to hold that the courts of the asylum
state can look behind the extradition
warrant for an out-of-state parolee, and
inquire into the nature of the alleged
violation."' It is clearly the only case
to use the ground of probable prejudice
of the foreign parole board. The general rule is that the courts of the asylum
- state will neglect or refuse to go into
the propriety of the parole revocation.2
There is an intimation, however, in
Ex parte Carroll, 86 Tex. Crim. 301,
217 S. W. (2d) 382 (1920), that the
court might be. slower to refuse habeas
corpus if the parolee could show by
conclusive evidence that he had not
violated his parole and was not a fugitive from justice.
The cases can be divided conveniently into two groups, those in which
the parolee entered another state with
parole was involved. See Glass v. Becker, 25 F.

(2d) 929 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
82 State ex rel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister, 336 Mo.
682, 80 S. W. (2d) 195 (1935); Ex parte Foster, 60
Okla. Crim. 50, 61 Pac. (2d) 37 (1936); Ex parte
Walton, 133 Tex. Crim. 534, 112 S. W. (2d) 467
(1937); Ex parte Gordon, 105 Vt. 277, 165 Atl. 905
(1933). Cf. 18 USCA sec. 662, note 61, pp. 329, 330,
331. Reed v. Colpoys, 69 App. D. C. 163, 99 F. (2d)

396 (1938).
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the permission or at the request of the
parole board, and those in which he violated his parole by his very act of entering the second state. As .to the latter
situation, it has been clear since 1896,
when the Connecticut court in the case
of Drinkall v. Spiega 83 refused habeas
corpus to a New York parolee, that
extradition cannot be questioned. Properly authenticated requisition- papers
are all that seem to be necessary.- In
regard to the situation where a condition .of the parole is that the parolee
reside and work in another state, it
seems equally clear that he is subject
to extradition and the court of the
asylum state will not inquire into the
violative act."5 Where the parolee has
secured the later permission of the
board to enter another state, it has now
become the settled law that he is subject to extradition at the duly authenticated request of the paroling state,8
although some of the courts had trouble
interpreting the word "flee" in Article
IV, Section 2 of the federal Constitution
to apply to the situation where the
parolee left with the board's permission
and blessing.
The word "flee" has two components:
voluntary departure, and intent to flee.
The widespread adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 8 7 seems
to be eliminating the intent to flee as a
prerequisite to extradition, but the issue of voluntary departure is still
open. 88 However, the New Jersey court
has taken a lone stand in the interests
83

68 Conn. 441, 36 Ati. 830, 36 L. R. A. 486.

84 See Ex parte Gordon, supra, n. 82, and Ex

parte Carroll, supra.
85 Ex parte Nabors, 33 N. M. 324, 267 Pac. 58
(1928).
81,54 H. L. I. 508 (Jan. 1941) lists the cases. Cf.
78 A. L. R. 422 (1931); Ex parte Garvey, 133 Tex.
Crim. 500. 112 S. W. (2d) 747 (1938); Bartel v.

of justice and held a parolee extraditable even though he was involuntarily
forced across the state line by police
authorities 9 Here, a New York parolee was convicted in New York of a
federal offense and taken to New Jersey
to serve his sentence in the federal
prison. Leaving New York state was
a violation of one of the parole conditions. Upon his release in New Jersey,
he petitioned for habeas corpus, but the
court refused to giant his freedom,
holding the motives and causes of his
leaving New York immaterial.
In order to bring within the definition of "fugitive from justice," the Illinois court in People ex rel. Mark v.
Toman ° did some fancy talking. Here,
the Illinois Supreme Court declared the
parolee extraditable to New York and
dismissed the appeal of a second habeas
corpus proceeding, after a lower court
had twice granted the parolee's release
and uttered dire threats at the persistent New York parole agents. The
reasoning of the appellate court was
that the parolee became extraditable,
not as a parole violator, but as a "fugitive from justice" the moment that the
New York parole board revoked his
parole and invoked his unexpired sentence. The case is also interesting for
the proposition that a habeas corpus
judgment in an extradition case does
not go to the merits sufficiently to
render it res judicata,but further extradition proceeding is possible.
O'Grady, ... Neb ... , 292 N. W. 383 (1940).
87 9 Unif. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1938) 39-40.
88 Cf. 40 H. L. R. 902 (1927); 51 H. L. R. 1446
(1938).
HO
Re Cohen, 104 N. J. Eq. 560, 146 AtI. 423 (1928).
This is in accord with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of "flee" in Appleyard v.
Mass., 203 U. S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. 122.
D0 362 Ill. 232, 199 N. E. 124 (1935).

CARTER H. WHITE

Some courts have had difficulty with
the phrase "charged with crime" in the
Constitution. But in 1905 the Circuit
Court of AFpeals decided that this included conviction as well as the technical charge or indictment before conviction."
It seems to matter little whether the
act alleged to be a parole violation occurred in the asylum state or the paroling state. Other than the two exceptions already noted, 92 the court of the

asylum state will not look into the evidence to determine the justification for
extradition.

3

Even

where

the

total

time elapsed from conviction exceeds
the sentence, the court will refuse to
usurp the function of the foreign parole
board of determining the validity of the
revocation, 94 provided that the violation itself occurred before the end of
the maximum sentence.
When the parole was obtained by
fraud, the parolee is subject to extradition even though he was granted permission to go to the asylum state. In
People ex rel. Hutchings v. Mallon, 5
the extradition of "Big Hutch," bunco
artist extraordinaire, by Governor Al
Smith was upheld by the New York
Court of Appeals, where it appeared
that a parole had been fraudulently
obtained from the California parole
board by concealing relevant facts as
to Hutch's past activities through connivance of various politicians. The parole gave permission to go to New
91 Hughes v. Pflany, 71 C. C. A. 234, 138 Fed. 980.
92 The New York and Nevada cases. supra n.

80 and 81.
93 Ex parte Carroll, supra, (violation in paroling state); State ex Tel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister.
supra, (in asylum stat'1
94 Reed v. Colpoys, supra where the viola-

tion occurred before the end of the maximum
sentence.

York, but this provision received little
attention from the New York court.
The California governor requested
extradition, attaching his reasons for
revoking the parole, and extradition
was granted. The court gave liberal
construction to the word "flee," abiding
by the Supreme Court's authority in
Appleyard v. Mass.9
The problem of what would happen
if the governor of the asylum state
should refuse extradition at the request
of the governor of the demanding state
arose as early as 1860, when the Supreme Court decided that the courts of
the demanding state had no power to
issue mandamus to compel the gov97
ernor of the asylum state to extradite.
The federal extradition statute98 .has
been so construed up to the present.
By analogy, this rule would apply to
the extradition of a paroled convict,
although no cases have arisen on this
issue. The purpose of the Uniform Act
for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision '
is to prevent such a situation from arising by abolishing the governor's discretion and other extradition formalities.
A troublesome problem which may
often arise is whether a prisoner out
on parole in the paroling state is subject to extradition for a pending indictment or conviction of another crime in
another state. Carpenter v. Lord00
holds that the paroling state has control over the parolee- until the end of
his term and should not extradite be95 218 App. Div. 461, 218 N. Y. Supp. 432 (1926),
aff'd 245 N. Y. 521,157 N. E. 842 (1927).
,1(See n. 89, supra
97 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

98 Rev. Stat. sec. 5278 (1875), 18 U. S. C. sec. 662
(1934). Cf. 67 U. S. L. Rev. 58 (1933); 69 Minn. 104,
729N.
W. 53 (1897).
9

lnfra, n. 105.
100 88 Oregon 128, 171 Pac. 577 (1918). Cf. L. X.

A. 1918 D, 680.
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fore then. A somewhat analogous situation occurred in State ex rel. Nicholson v. Bush,"" where a felon-parolee
was held to be in the - custody of the
parole board so as to preclude arrest
and confinement in a county jail in the
same state for a misdemeanor of which
he had been convicted simultaneously
with the felony. Where an out-of-state
parolee commits a crime in the-asylum
state, this rule of first jurisdictioncompletion of jurisdiction is rarely applied. The usual practice is for the
ayslum state to dispose of the new
crime by conviction, sentence, and impris.onment, and then listen to the demands of the paroling state. 1 2 The
argument for this practice is that the
evidence should be used while fresh
and sentence completed in order to
avoid double extradition. The argument against it is that the parole board
still exercises control over a parolee
even when beyond the state line, and
this jurisdiction should be completed
before action by the second state.

about his parole and acquiesced therein. The court said that the inchoate
right of California to reclaim him
should not serve to secure in Connecticut an asylum from the just demands
of Michigan.
As to extradition between foreign
countries, such right exists only by
virtue of treaty provisions. In U. S. v.
AUison 1° the Canadian court held that
a person-found in Canada who had been
convicted in the United States of an
extraditable crime and subsequently
paroled to Canada, and who had violated his parole while in Canada, could
be extradited to the United States. The
ground was, not that he had violated
his parole, which is not an extraditable
crime, but that he was a fugitive under
the Canadian Extradition Act, which
defined a fugitive as a "person being
in Canada who is accused or convicted
of an extraditable crime committed
within the jurisdiction of a foreign
state."
What effect has been had on this
The question of extradition becomes problem of extradition of paroled conmore complex when three states are victs by the passage of the Interstate
involved: the paroling state, the asylum Crime Commission's Uniform Act for
state, and the demanding state. In Von Out-of-State Probationer and Parolee
Walden v. Geides,103 the Connecticut Supervision? Since its introduction in
Supreme Court held that a prisoner 1937, thirty-two states have passed the
paroled by California with permission enabling act and thirty-four have beto reside in Connecticut could not de- come signatory to the interstate comfeat *his extradition to Michigan to pact. 0 5 The advantage of this act over
answer a charge of crime committed the Uniform Criminal Extradition
there by setting up the defenses that Act,108 which to date has been enacted
his parole had three years to run and by thirty -states, is that the former
that the Michigan authorities knew waives all extradition formalities and
o 136 Tenn. 478, 190 S. W. 453 (1916).
But see State v. Hoffmeister, supra where

102

the parolee was extradited to Illinois although

uftder arrest in - Missouri for a misdemeanor
committed there.

os 105 Conn. 374, 135 Atl. 396 (1926).

104

... N. S. ... , 42D. L. R:595 (1918).

105 Handbook-on Interstate Crime Control (1940

ed.), Interstate Commission on Crime. Alabama,
which became signatory in October, 1940, has
been included in the figure 34.
108 Sec. 22 treats fugitive parolees.
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enables officers of the paroling state to
enter other signatory states, for the
purpose of retaking a parolee, without
being subjected to the cumbersome and
tedious habeas corpus proceeding. The
only requirement is that the parole
officer be properly identified with duly
authenticated papers. That the act has
been widely used in its some three
years of existence is evidenced by caseload statistics in the commission's handbook, p. 72. As of September, 1938,
the number of out-of-state parolees
under supervision, in accordance with
the provisions of the compact, was 1,691,
with Illinois and New Jersey having
over 300 apiece, mostly from adjacent
states. New York has supplied a considerable caseload to New Jersey, although the former is not a signatory
state.
The constitutional legality of these
interstate compacts on crime is established.""7 They were legalized by the
Crime Control Consent Act of 1934
(18 U. S. C. A. 7), which eliminated
the objection of Article I, Section 10,
clause 3 of the Federal Constitution
that "no state shall, without the consent
of Congress, enter into any agreement
or compact with another state."
The case of People ex rel. Pahl v.
Pollack, supra, involving the denial by
a New York court of a request by the
Pennsylvania parole board for extradition of a parolee, could not have
arisen if New York had been a fellow
signatory of Pennsylvania. It is likely
that the body of extradition law as to
out-of-state parolees will entirely disappear as the remaining fifteen or more
107 This constitutional history is set out in the
Handbook, supra p. 73.

states pass the uniform act and sign
the compact. In the meantime, the effect of the Pollack case may be to discourage parole boards of signatory
states from permitting parolees to go
to non-signatory states.
The only reported case under the
uniform act is that of Martin v. Sullivan, which arose in an Iowa inferior
court in January, 1938.'0" Here, Martin
had been paroled from Illinois in 1931
on agreement that he could be returned
without formality whenever he violated
the conditions of his parole. In 1932 he
was convicted of a crime in Iowa and
committed to the Iowa penitentiary.
On his release in December, 1937, he
was arrested by Illinois parole officers.
On a habeas corpus hearing, the Iowa
court delivered him to the Illinois officers on proof that both Illinois and Iowa
had become signatories to the interstate compact by September, 1937.
VII. SUMMARY

Some form of parole system exists in
all of the forty-eight states, and the
federal government. Legal problems
arising out of this situation depend necessarily on the particular statute as
presently existing, so that as a result
no integrated body of law has grown
up. In addition, although parole has
been a penal treatment for over half a
century, the law on the subject is in
its infancy, most of the problems having arisen in the last two decades.
The constitutionality of parole statutes has been established, many states
avoiding objections by placing dual
power in the governor and a parole
I s See Handbook, supra p. 77.
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board. With two exceptions, 9 no constitutional issue -has been considered
since the Ughbanks case in 1908.
A prison inmate is not entitled as a
matter of right to a parole even though
he meets the eligibility requirements,
but he may be able to force the parole
board to consider his case. Eligibility
for parole depends entirely on the parole statute, varying from first offenders
under 25, only, to no discrimination except service of minimum sentence.
Treason, first degree murder, and life
imprisonment crimes are usually excluded from parole consideration. Court
review is not available as to the procedure or the factors considered by the
board in refusing to grant parole.
Any reasonable condition that is not
immoral, illegal, or impossible of performance can be legally attached to a
parole. The only objectionable condition which is upheld in certain jurisdictions" is that of restricting the parolee
beyond his maximum sentence, although some criminologists might also
object to detailed conditions such as
attending church regularly and refraining from the use of tobacco.
A convict's civil rights, such as voting or holding office, are not restored
by parole; on the contrary, a parolee is
like a prison inmate. He is immune
from arrest and imprisonment, except
for an offense committed while on parole, but he is subject to trial for any
crime committed prior or subsequent
to parole.
Ordinarily, a parolee cannot be held
beyond the expiration of his maximum
sentence, although a few "conditional
109 Woods

v.

Tenn.

and People v.

Mikula,

supra, n. 9 and 16 J. Crim. L. 40.
x1o This condition is upheld in only a few "con-

pardon" jurisdictions allow this
whether or not the parole instrument
has an express condition to that effect. 11' Most parole statutes specifically
provide that a parolee is entitled to a
hearing before the parole board or commissioner if his parole is revoked; some
provide for summary revocation without hearing. Sometimes the parole instrument itself makes specific provision.
Where both are silent, a court hearing
is generally held to be the parolee's
right. Since a parole may not be revoked except for violation of its conditions, or illegal and unwarranted grant
in the first place, the hearing is on one
of these issues, generally the former.
The hearing accorded by the parole
board is seldom reviewable in court.
However, the reconfined parolee is always protected by his right to a court
hearing on the issues of confinement
beyond his term, his identity, and the
authority to revoke of the officials who
did revoke.
Whether parole operates to suspend
sentence depends on the particular statute or judicial decisions. The orthodox
view, followed by a majority of ihe
states and the federal courts, is that
it does not. Whether time served on
parole counts to the credit of the reimprisoned parolee also depends on the
particular state statute and decisions.
The orthodox view here seems to be
that, contrary to the federal statute,
time on parole does count for the
prisoner. Where a parolee has been
convicted and sentenced for a crime
committed while on parole, the parole
statute ordinarily provides that the
ditional pardon" states.
3.1 These few states generally have a statute
providing that parole suspends sentence.
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prior unexpired sentence is separate
and shall be served first, or it provides
that the second sentence shall state

whether it is to be served consecutively
or concurrently with the first. In the
absence of express provision, the rule
is that the sentences are concurrent.
As to which of two statutes governing revocation procedure a parolee is
subject, the sound view is that he is
subject to the statute in force when he
violates his parole.
Ordinarily, in extradition proceedings, the court of the asylum state will
not inquire into the issue of parole violation, but will grant extradition where
the demand of the paroling state meets
all the formal requirements. A few
courts will, however, investigate the
substantive problem. The Uniform Outof-State Parolee Supervision Act, in
force in about thirty-five states, has
eliminated these procedural and substantive problems by waiving extradition formalities.
The most urgently needed reform in
the whole field of parole is a pure indeterminate sentence law, with no maximum or .minimum sentence provision,
and a parole statute incorporating a
prison reformatory system and placing
sole power to grant or revoke parole
and fix conditions in a parole board of
five, seven, or nine men and women, depending on the size of the state, who
will be appointed for good behavior on
a merit basis and will devote their
whole time to parole matters, at an adequate salary. The law and the courts
should steer clear of the parole field,
which is a specialized branch demanding specialized training. Until this
Utopia is attained, hope must be pinned

on a gradual enlightenment of legislators and a gradual improvement in the
personnel of the judiciary and prison
and parole officialdom. Other matters,
such as closer cooperation between
prison officials, parole officials, and psychiatrists, are better left to the criminologists.
VIII.

APPENDIX

Table of ParolingAuthorities in the Several
States and the FederalGovernment

Separate parole board created for that
•purpose alone: (12)
Federal, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia,
Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Florida (pardon board-conditional pardon).
Parole board within a governmental department: (2)
Illinois (Public Safety Department),
Massachusetts (Department of Correction).
Parole duties added to others already incumbent on a pardon board or board of
prison commissioners: (4)
Arkansas, Califorriia, Maine, Montana.
Separate parole board for each penal institution consisting of the board of trustees
of that institution: (2)
Connecticut, Florida (only boys' and
girls' industrial schools).
Board of pardons or paroles of which the
governor is one member: (7)
Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah.
Parole power in governor only on recommendation of the parole board, or in
parole board only with approval of
governor: (7)
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin.
Governor alone, with advisory power in a
parole board: (2)
Alabama, Oklahoma.
Governor, with the help of a commissioner: (4)
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina,
West Virginia.
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Governor alone: (6)
Colorado, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Virginia and Vermont (governor--conditional pardon), Wyoming (parole only
of convicts under twenty-five, 'first
offenders).
Miscellaneous: (4)
Indiana (parole by Board of Public Welfare on recommendation of trustees).
Mississippi (no parole statite, but probably power in the board of prison commissioners to grant restricted release, or
in the governor to grant conditional
pardon).
New Hampshire (governor with advice

of council).
Tennessee (commissioner alone).
Notes on Parole Statutes
Only Mississippi and Virginia are without legislation as to parole, and in Virginia
the governor grants conditional pardon
under the state constitution. Florida and
Vermont, by statute, confuse conditional
pardon and parole, the former placing conditional pardon power in a board-of pardons, the latter in the governor. New
Hampshire uses the statutory term "permit" rather than parole. Every other state
has a statute specifically creating a parole
system, eo nomine.
The parole board may be called by
various names, such as board of pardons
and paroles, board of prison terms, prison
commission, clemency commission, and the
like. Personnel, as provided by statute,
ranges from governor to superintendent of
public instruction, from prison warden to
private citizen of good repute, from
supreme court judge to physician, from
secretary of state or attorney-general to
chairman of the public works and highway department or president of the board
of agriculture. The number of members
may vary from a commissioner of one to a

board consisting of eight. New Jersey is
unique in having a "Court of Pardons"
composed of the governor, the chancellor,
and the six judges of the Court of Errors
and Appeals, who act only- for the state
prison. The board of managers of every
other penal institution is the parole authority in collaboration with other agencies.
Washington, by 1935 statute, provides for
a maximum sentence law with sole power
in the Board of Prisons, Terms, and Paroles
to set -the definite minimum term and time
for parole. Georgia is alone in its 1938
statutory experiment of creating a Prison
and Parole Commission of three members
to be elected by the people.
The board may be a separate entity
created solely for parole purpose, or it may
be an already existing pardon board, or it
may be part of a governmental department
as in Massachusetts and Illinois. Unanimous vote of its members may be necessary, or only a majority. New York has
created, besides its state parole board, a
Parole Commission for First Class Cities,
whose revoking acts are subject to court
review only if the sentence was for more
than three years.
Final discharge from parole is possible,
in more than one-half the states, before the
expiration of the maximum sentence. Some
statutes allow, others forbid application for
parole by the prisoner or his attorney or
friends.
By a bill passed by the Illinois State
Legislature, July 1, 1941, the Parole Board
and its duties have been transferred from
the Department of Public Welfare to a
newly created Department of Public Safety. The new Parole Board is now called:
"The Divisioi of Correction" and is composed of five members: The Superintendent
of Prisons, Superintendent of Paroles,
Superintendent of Supervision of Parolees,
Superintendent of Crime Prevention; and
the State Criminologist.

